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Abstract 
  
We analyze the impact of urban population growth on individual utility in a general 
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with product diversity, pro-competitive effect 
and heterogeneity of labor efficiency between workers. We assume a monocentric city where 
high-income class resides in the center while low-income class resides in the suburbs. When 
urban population grows, utility level increases through the mass and price of product varieties 
and land rent earned, while it decreases through effective labor supply and land rent paid. Each 
LPSDFWRQZRUNHU¶VXWLOLW\WKURXJKthese five factors is investigated separately. Finally, it is 
shown that, in case where urban population increases without the reduction of commuting 
cost and the increase in labor efficiency, middle-income class has the highest possibility to 
lose utility and high-income class also has the possibility, while low-income class always 
gains. 
 
Keywords: utility level, urban population growth, heterogeneity of labor efficiency, mass of 
varieties, price of varieties, effective labor supply, land rent earned, land rent paid 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
One of the important issues in urban/spatial economics is whether the utility level of 
citizens in a city increases or decreases as urban population grows. Textbooks on urban 
economics such as Mills and Hamilton (1997) and O¶Sullivan (2012) present that cities have 
both economy and diseconomy of scale. In general, in the range of smaller population, utility 
increases as the urban population grows, while, in the range of larger population, utility 
decreases. At the birth of a city, it grows in terms of the economies of scale at the city level 
such as increasing returns to scale in production, face-to-face communication, transaction 
costs and the mass of varieties in product. As the population grows, urban costs such as land 
rent, commuting cost, congestion and pollution increase. In a model of an autarkic city the 
optimal city size is determined at the population which equalizes the marginal economy and 
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diseconomy, and in a model of a system of cities the city sizes are determined at the levels of 
population which equalize utilities of the cities. 
Although most of papers in urban/spatial economics assume that workers are identical, 
there exist a small number of papers made up of two groups of papers which introduce 
workers with heterogeneity. One is the group which analyzes the impact of heterogeneity on a 
city or a system of cities. Mansoorian and Myers (1993) introduced individuals with different 
degrees of attachment to homes and showed that an incentive to make interregional transfers 
in purchasing is necessary to realize the preferred population distribution in a system of cities. 
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) concluded that taste heterogeneity acts as a strong dispersion force 
and full agglomeration does not realize in a two-region model. Murata (2003) showed that 
market-mediated product diversity yields an agglomeration force through the home market 
effect, whereas taste heterogeneity due to non-market interaction induces a dispersion force. 
Amiti and Pissarides (2005) introduced skill differentiation between workers and showed that 
the reduction of labor mismatch is one of agglomeration forces.  
The other is the group which analyzes the impact of the change in a city or a system of 
cities on workers with heterogeneity. Behrens and Murata (2012a) introduced heterogeneity 
of labor efficiency between workers with a variable-elasticity-of-substitution type utility 
function. They concluded that, when an economy transitions from autarky to free trade, the 
mass of varieties may shrink in a higher income country and the richer consumers in the 
country may lose. 
    This paper belongs to the latter group. We introduce heterogeneity of workers to a 
monocentric city model and analyze the impact of urban population change on the utility of 
workers. There exist various kinds of heterogeneities between workers which include 
attachment to homes, skill, taste and labor efficiency described above. At the first step, we 
pick heterogeneity of labor efficiency for our subject of study since we can easily infer that 
workers who vary in income caused by labor efficiency are affected differently in change of 
social environment and the income distribution is statistically measured. Figure 1 illustrates 
the taxable income distribution per worker employed in the private sector in Tokyo 
metropolitan area. It implies that for the most part the distribution is decreasing in income. 
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Taxable income per taxpayer(Unit: million Japanese yen)  
Figure 1. Taxable income distribution in Tokyo metropolitan area: prefectures of Chiba, 
Tokyo, Kanagawa and Yamanashi (Source: National Tax Agency, Japan, 2012, Survey on 
employee income in the priva te sec tor) 
 
Figure 2. Regional distribution of taxable income per taxpayer in Tokyo metropolitan area: 
Prefectures of Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba and Kanagawa (Source: National Tax Agency, Japan, 
2013, Survey on imposi t ion of munic ipal tax) 
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In general, high-income class in U.S. tends to reside in the suburbs, while in Asia, 
Europe and Latin America, low-income class resides in the suburbs (Muth (1969) and 
Hohenberg and Lees(1986)). Muth(1969) explained this tendency with the difference of 
income elasticities of land demand and commuting cost. Fujita (1989) introduced the value of 
commuting time in addition to pecuniary payment for commuting in order to explain the 
tendency that middle-class resides farthest in the San Francisco Bay Area, which is the result 
of empirical research in Wheaton(1977). Bruckner e t a l . (1999) presented an amenity-based 
theory for the relative location of different income classes in Paris. Tokyo is one of giant 
metropolises in Asia. Figure 2 illustrates the regional distribution of the taxable income per 
taxpayer. It implies that, in general, high-income class resides closer to the center of Tokyo 
metropolitan area, and income level is decreasing with distance. We analyze the relationship 
between urban population growth and utility level of workers in the urban areas like Tokyo 
metropolitan area where high-income class resides in the center. 
Although urban area is two-dimensional, one-dimensional models are frequently 
employed for the analysis of urban structure such as Fujita and Ogawa (1980), Ota and Fujita 
(1993), and Fujita and Krugman (1995). We also apply one-dimensional model to the study. 
In the model, when urban population grows, utility level increases through the mass and price 
of product varieties and land rent earned, and decreases through effective labor supply at the 
Central Business District and land rent paid. $IWHUHDFKLPSDFWRQZRUNHU¶VXWLOLW\WKURXJKILYH
factors is shown separately, the total impact on utility is investigated. The result indicates that, 
in case where urban population increases without the reduction of commuting cost and the 
increase in labor efficiency, workers with middle labor efficiency have the highest possibility 
to lose utility and workers with higher labor efficiency also have the possibility, while 
workers with lower labor efficiency always gain. 
   This paper is in five parts. Section 2 lays out the assumptions of the model. We derive 
endogenously determined variables under spatial equilibrium conditions in Section 3 and 
present the impact on workers with heterogeneity of labor efficiency in terms of population 
growth in Section 4. Section 5 considers the implication for the bottom line and roughly 
compares the result and Tokyo metropolitan area. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
We assume that a monocentric city on a large homogeneous land which stretches out 
along one-dimensional space ॿ and the amount of land available at each location ݔ א ॿ is 
one. All firms in the city are located at a single dimensionless point, Central Business District 
(henceforth, CBD), hence they do not consume land. We label the location of the CBD as the 
origin of ॿ. The land of the city is consumed only by workers to live on. Workers commute 
to firms located at the CBD to earn wages and consume land and varieties produced by firms. 
For land ownership, we employ the public land ownership model in Fujita (1989). We 
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consider the city as an individual jurisdiction that owns the land of its region, and there exists 
no global government. Namely, each worker living in the city owns an equal share of land, 
and receives an income from their land ownership in addition to their wage. For simplicity, 
farmer¶s rent is assumed to be zero. Each worker needs a fixed living space, that is, he/she 
consumes a unit of land inelastically. This implies that workers live symmetrically around the 
CBD and that the commuting distance of workers who live farthest from the CBD is ܮ ʹΤ , that 
is, the city covers the interval ሾെܮ ʹǡ ܮ ʹΤΤ ሿ, where ܮ ൐ Ͳ is the urban population of workers 
given exogenously. 
Each worker is endowed with labor efficiency ݄ ൒ Ͳ and supplies it inelastically to 
firms at the CBD. We introduce heterogeneity of labor efficiency between workers by putting 
the distribution function of labor efficiency ݃ሺ݄ሻ and the cumulative distribution function 
ܩሺ݄ሻ as follows: 
 
݀ܩሺ݄ሻ ൌ ݃ሺ݄ሻ݄݀ , 
ܩሺͲሻ ൌ Ͳǡ ܩሺ݄௠௔௫ሻ ൌ ͳ . 
 
Functions ݃ሺ݄ሻ and ܩሺ݄ሻ are assumed to be continuously differentiable for ݄ ג ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ. 
The average labor efficiency ݄ is given as follows: 
 
݄ ൌ න ݄
௛೘ೌೣ
଴
݃ሺ݄ሻ݄݀ . 
 
We assume that commuting cost borne by workers is of iceberg type, following Murata and 
Thisse (2005) and Behrens and Murata (2009). Discount factor߬ incurred by commuting 
from the location ݔ to the CBD is 
 
߬ ؠ ͳ െ ʹߠȁݔȁ,!  
 
where ߠ ൐ Ͳ is the parameter of labor efficiency loss caused by commuting. The effective 
labor supply ݏ which is the net amount of labor supplied at the CBD by a worker with labor 
efficiency ݄ living at a distance ݔ from the CBD is given by 
 
ݏ ൌ ݄߬ ൌ ݄ሺͳ െ ʹߠȁݔȁሻ.! (1) 
 
Under this assumption of commuting costs, the maximum city size in the model is ͳ ߠΤ Ǥ 
There exist three major utility functions employed in monopolistic competition models. 
The utility function most frequently employed is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
type utility function, which is based on horizontally differentiated varieties , introduced in 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Models with a CES type utility function have income effect but do 
not have pro-competitive effect. Another frequently employed utility function is the quadratic 
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utility function with a continuum of varieties, which is proposed in Vives (1985) and 
introduced into spatial economics in Ottaviano e t a l. (2002). Models with a quadratic utility 
function have pro-competitive effect but do not have income effect. The third is the 
variable-elasticity-of-substitution（VES） type utility function which is introduced in Behrens 
and Murata(2007). Models with a VES type utility function have both income and 
pro-competitive effects. Since we analyze the impact including income and price changes, 
following Behrens and Murata (2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b) and Behrens e t a l .(2008, 2013), 
we employ a following VES type utility function: 
 
ܷ ؠ නݑሺݍሺ݅ሻሻ݀݅
ఆ
 ,! (2) 
 
where, ݑሺݍሺ݅ሻሻ ؠ ͳ െ ݁ିఈ௤ሺ௜ሻ, ݍሺ݅ሻ is the quantity of variety ݅ consumed by a worker, ߗ is 
the set of varieties produced in the city and ߙ ൐ Ͳ is a utility parameter. 
    All firms have the same increasing returns to scale technology, and require ሺܿܳሺ݅ሻ ൅
݂ሻ݄଴ units of labor to produce ܳሺ݅ሻ units of varieties, where ܿ ൐ Ͳ is the marginal and ݂ ൐
Ͳ is the fixed labor requirements. We assume that firms can costlessly differentiate their 
products. This implies that, under the increasing returns to scale technology, there is 
one-to-one correspondence between firms and varieties, so that the mass of varieties ܰ is 
equal to the mass of firms (Fujita e t a l . (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2013)). Transport costs of 
varieties in the city are assumed to be zero. 
 
 
3. Spatial equilibrium 
 
We label the wage which is paid for the labor supply ݄଴ at the CBD as ݓ଴. On the 
assumption of production technology, the contribution of each worker to production is 
proportional to effective labor supply, hence the wage ݓ for the effective labor ݏ is 
 
ݓ ൌ ݓ଴ሺݏ ݄଴Τ ሻ . 
 
Without loss of generality, we put ݓ଴Ȁ݄଴ ൌ ͳ. Hence we have ݓ ൌ ݏ, and, hereafter, we can 
use wage ݓ and effective labor supply ݏ interchangeably. 
Assigning effective labor supply ݏ to wage ݓ in (1) yields 
 
ݓ ൌ ݄ሺͳ െ ʹߠȁݔȁሻ. (3) 
 
Since the city is symmetric around the CBD, hereafter, we consider the positive half of the 
area ݔ ൒ Ͳ. We obtain the gradient of a bid-rent curve of each worker by differentiating the 
wage with respect to the location ݔ as follows: 
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݀ݓ
݀ݔ
ൌ െʹ݄ߠ . (4) 
 
As shown in Fujita (1989), a worker with the steeper gradient of a bid-rent curve lives closer 
to the CBD. Since (4) shows that the absolute value of the gradient of a bid-rent curve is 
proportional to the labor efficiency of each worker, a worker with higher labor efficiency 
lives closer to the CBD. A worker lives at the position where the gradient of the land rent ܴ 
is equal to that of her bid-rent curve as follows: 
 
ܴ݀
݀ݔ
ൌ െʹ݄ߠ .!  
 
With attention to the assumption that each worker consumes a unit of land inelastically, 
integrating the above equation yields 
 
ܴ ൌ ܴ଴ െ
ܮ
ʹ
න ʹߠ݄݃ሺ݄ሻ݄݀
௛೘ೌೣ
௛
ൌ ܴ଴ െ ߠܮන ݄݃ሺ݄ሻ݄݀
௛೘ೌೣ
௛
 
, 
 
 
where ܴ଴ is land rent at the CBD. Since workers with labor efficiency ݄ ൌ Ͳ live at the 
urban boundary, ȁݔȁ ൌ ܮ ʹΤ , and their land rent ܴ௅Ȁଶ is zero on the assumption of that 
farmer¶s rent is zero, we obtain the land rent at the CBD as follows: 
 
 
ܴ௅Ȁଶ ൌ ܴ଴ െ ߠܮන ݄݃ሺ݄ሻ݄݀
௛೘ೌೣ
଴
ൌ ܴ଴ െ ߠܮ݄ ൌ Ͳ , 
 
hence ܴ଴ ൌ ߠܮത݄. The land rent expressed in terms of the labor efficiency ݄ of a worker is 
 
ܴ ൌ ߠܮ ቊ݄ െන ݄݃ሺ݄ሻ݄݀
௛೘ೌೣ
௛
ቋ 
. 
(5) 
 
Since each worker consumes a unit size of land and workers with higher labor efficiency 
live closer to the CBD, we obtain the relationship between a place of residence ݔ and labor 
efficiency ݄ as follows: 
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ݔ ൌ
ܮ
ʹ
ሼܩሺ݄୫ୟ୶ሻ െ ܩሺ݄ሻሽ
ൌ
ܮ
ʹ
ሼͳ െ ܩሺ݄ሻሽ 
. 
(6) 
 
After a specific cumulative distribution function ܩሺ݄ሻ is given, we can obtain the 
relationship between location and land rent by substituting the inverse function of (6) into 
(5).  
Expenditure for varieties by a worker is 
 
ܧ ൌ ݏ െ ܴ ൅ ሺߎ ൅ ܣܮܴሻȀܮ  , (7) 
 
where the first term on the right hand is the wage earned by the effective labor supply, the 
second term is the land rent paid for a unit of land, and the third term is the total profit of 
firms and aggregate land rent per capita. The utility maximization problem of a worker is 
given by 
 

ݍሺ݅ሻǡ ݅ ג ߗ ܷ＝න ݑሺݍሺ݅ሻሻ݀݅ ݏǤ ݐǤ න݌ሺ݅ሻݍሺ݅ሻ݀݅ ൌ ܧ
ఆఆ
 
, 
(8) 
 
where ݌ሺ݅ሻ is the price of variety ݅. Solving this maximization yields the demand for variety   
݅ as follows: 
 
ݍሺ݅ሻ ൌ
ܧ െ ͳߙ ׬  ൬
݌ሺ݅ሻ
݌ሺ݆ሻ൰ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀ఆ
׬ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀ఆ
 
. 
(9) 
 
    Here, we derive the aggregate labor supply at the CBD, the aggregate expenditure for 
varieties and the aggregate demand for variety ݅ for future reference. The aggregate labor 
supply at the CBD ܵ is as follows: 
 
ܵ ൌ න ݏ݀ݔ
௅
ଶ
ି௅ଶ
 
. 
(10) 
 
The aggregate expenditure for varieties ܣܧ is related to the aggregate labor supply as 
follows: 
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ܣܧ ؠ න ܧ݀ݔ
௅
ଶ
ି௅ଶ
ൌ න ൜ݏ െ ܴ ൅
ߎ ൅ ܣܮܴ
ܮ
ൠ݀ݔ
௅
ଶ
ି௅ଶ
ൌ ܵ , 
(11) 
 
where we apply the fact that ܣܮܴ is the total amount of the land rent ܴ over the city and the 
zero profit condition for firms which is assumed afterwards. The aggregate demand ܳሺ݅ሻ for 
variety ݅ is related to the aggregate labor supply at the CBD ܵ and the prices of varieties 
݌ሺ݅ሻ as follows: 
 
 
ܳሺ݅ሻ ؠ න ݍሺ݅ሻ݀ݔ ൌ
ܵ െ ܮߙ ׬  ൬
݌ሺ݅ሻ
݌ሺ݆ሻ൰ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀ఆ
׬ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀ఆ
௅
ଶ
ି௅ଶ
 
. 
(12) 
 
The price elasticity ߳ of the aggregate demand is  
 
߳ ൌ െ
݌ሺ݅ሻ
ܳሺ݅ሻ
߲ܳሺ݅ሻ
߲݌ሺ݅ሻ
ൌ
ܮ
ߙܳሺ݅ሻ
 
, 
(13) 
 
which is inversely proportional to ߙ and ܳሺ݅ሻ. 
The profit of a firm is given by the following equation: 
 
ߨሺ݅ሻ ൌ ݌ሺ݅ሻܳሺ݅ሻ െ ሺܿܳሺ݅ሻ ൅ ݂ሻ݄଴ . (14) 
 
We assume free entry and exit of firms, hence the profit of firms is zero at the equilibrium. 
Each firm maximizes its profit (14) with respect to ݌ሺ݅ሻ, taking expenditure for varieties and 
the mass of firms given. Substituting (12) into (14) yields 
 
ߨሺ݅ሻ ൌ
ܵ െ ܮߙ ׬  ൬
݌ሺ݅ሻ
݌ሺ݆ሻ൰ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀ఆ
׬ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀ఆ
ሺ݌ሺ݅ሻ െ ݄଴ሻ െ ݂݄଴ 
. 
 
 
The first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to ݌ሺ݅ሻ is given as follows: 
 
න  ቆ
݌ሺ݅ሻ
݌ሺ݆ሻ
ቇ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
൅
݌ሺ݅ሻ െ ݄ܿ଴
݌ሺ݅ሻ
න݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
ൌ ߙܧത 
, 
(15) 
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where ܧ ൌ ܣܧȀܮ is the average expenditure for varieties by workers. We can prove that the 
price equilibrium is symmetric and unique（see Appendix A）. Evaluating (15) at the 
symmetric prices yields 
 
݌ ൌ ݄଴ ൅
ߙܧ
ܰ
 , (16) 
where ܰ is the mass of firms/varieties.    
 
At the symmetric price equilibrium, demands for varieties are also symmetric. In (14), 
eliminating the suffix ݅ which identifies a specific firm and using the macroscopic budget 
constraint ܣܧ ൌ ܰ݌ܳ yields 
 
ܳ ൌ
ͳ
ܿ
൬
ܵ
݄଴ܰ
െ ݂൰ 
. 
(17) 
 
The labor market clearing condition is given as follows: 
 
නሺܿܳ ൅ ݂ሻ݄଴݀݅ ൌ ܵ
ఆ
 . 
 
Substituting ܳ ൌ ܣܧȀܰ݌ into this equation and solving it for the mass of firms ܰ yields 
 
ܰ ൌ
ܵ
݂݄଴
൬ͳ െ
݄ܿ଴
݌
൰ 
. 
(18) 
 
We obtain the mass of firms in terms of the population by substituting (16) into (18) and 
solving the equation for the mass of firms ܰ as follows: 
 
ܰ ൌ
ܵ
݄଴ܮ
ܦሺܮሻ െ ߙ݂
ʹ݂ܿ
 
, 
(19) 
where ܦሺܮሻ ൌ ඥͶߙ݂ܿܮ ൅ ሺߙ݂ሻଶ .  
 
There exists a critical urban population ܮ෨ in (19). The mass of firms increases in the smaller 
urban population than ܮ෨ and decreases in the larger urban population than ܮ෨. In Behrens and 
Murata (2012a), the reason why utility of richer workers in a higher income country becomes 
lower is that, after the two countries transition from autarky to free trade, in tha case that the 
total population becomes larger than the critical population ܮ෨, the mass of varieties decreases 
in the country. 
Finally, under the symmetric quantity of varieties, indirect utility function of workers 
can be obtained as follows: 
11 
 
 
 ൌ ܰቀͳ െ ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻቁ , (20) 
where ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ ൌ
ͳ
ܰ݌
൫ݏ െ ܴ ൅ ܴ൯ , (21) 
 
where ܴ ൌ ܣܮܴȀܮ is aggregate land rent per capita. 
 
 
4. Relationship between urban population growth and utility level 
 
    When the urban population changes, as shown in (20), utility of a worker is affected 
through five variables: the mass of varieties ܰ, the price of varieties ݌, land rent earned ܴ, 
effective labor supply ݏ and land rent paid ܴ. The total differential of indirect utility 
function with respect to population can be broken down into five partial differentials as 
follows: 
 
ܸ݀
݀ܮ
ൌ
߲ܸ
߲ܰ
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൅
߲ܸ
߲݌
݀݌
݀ܮ
൅
߲ܸ
߲ܴ
ܴ݀
݀ܮ
൅
߲ܸ
߲ݏ
݀ݏ
݀ܮ
൅
߲ܸ
߲ܴ
ܴ݀
݀ܮ
 
. 
(22) 
 
    To take a step further, emulating the income distribution from statistics which is shown 
in Fig.1, we assume the distribution function of labor efficiency of workers as a linearly 
decreasing function, as follows: 
 
݃ሺ݄ሻ ൌ ൝
ʹ
݄௠௔௫
൬ͳ െ
݄
݄௠௔௫
൰
Ͳ
 ൜
Ͳ ൑ ݄ ൑ ݄௠௔௫
݄ ൏ Ͳǡ݄௠௔௫ ൏ ݄
 (23) 
The average labor efficiency under the distribution function ത݄ is ݄௠௔௫Ȁ͵Ǥ 
Figure 3 illustrates an example of the distribution function ݃ሺ݄ሻ. 
 
 
Figure 3. The distribution function ݃ሺ݄ሻ (The set of parameters applied to all figures is ܿ ൌ
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Labor Efficiency h
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Distribution g h
2
3 h
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0
12 
 
ͲǤͳ, ݂ ൌ ͲǤͳ, ߙ ൌ ͲǤʹ, ߠ ൌ ͲǤͷ, ܮ ൌ ͳ and ത݄ ൌ ͳ, unless otherwise noted.)  
 
From (5) and (6), the land rent under the distribution function (23) is 
 
ܴ ൌ
ߠܮ݄ଶ
͵ത݄
൬ͳ െ
ʹ݄
ͻത݄
൰ 
(24)  
ൌ ߠܮത݄ ቐͳ െ ͵൬
ʹݔ
ܮ
൰ ൅ ʹ൬
ʹݔ
ܮ
൰
ଷ
ଶ
ቑ 
 
Figure 4 illustrates an example of the land rent curve. It is strictly decreasing and convex in 
distance. 
  
Figure 4. Land rent curve (The set of parameters is shown at Fig.3.) 
 
 
For future reference, we note a number of variables under the distribution function (23) 
as follows: 
 
ݏ ൌ ݄ ቊͳ െ ߠܮ ൬ͳ െ
݄
͵ത݄
൰
ଶ
ቋ 
, 
(25) 
ܵ ൌ ത݄ܮ ൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰ 
, 
(26) 
ܧ ൌ ത݄ ൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰ 
, 
(27) 
തܴ ൌ
͵
ͳͲ
ത݄ߠܮ 
. 
(28) 
 
    As for the relationship between the population and the mass of varieties, examining 
(19) under the distribution function (23), the maximum of the mass of varieties is at the 
population ܮ ൌ ܮ෨, where 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Location x
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ܮ෨ ൌ
ሺͳͲܿ െ ߙ݂ߠሻ ൅ ඥͳͲߙ݂ܿߠ ൅ ሺߙ݂ߠሻଶ
ͻܿߠ
 . 
 
Since we can prove that ܮ෨ is larger than the maximum population ͳȀߠ (see Appendix B), 
the mass of varieties is always increasing in population. Figure 5 illustrates  an example of the 
relationship between the population and the masses of varieties. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between the population and the masses of varieties (The set of 
parameters is shown at Fig.3. ͳ ߠΤ ൌ ʹ and ܮ෨ ൎ ʹǤͶʹ͵͵) 
 
    In this section, at first, each impact on worker ¶s utility through five factors is examined 
separately. After that, the study on the total effect which synthesizes these five impacts is 
made. 
 
4.1 Separated impacts through five factors 
 
4.1.1 Impact through the mass of varieties 
    The impact on the indirect utility function through the change in the mass of varieties is 
derived by differentiating (20) with respect to ܰ as follows: 
 
μܸ
μܰ
ൌ ͳ െ ሺͳ ൅ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻሻ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡ஺௅ோǡ௦ǡோሻ 
, 
 
 
which is positive when ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ is positive. Since demand for each variety 
ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ is positive and increasing in labor efficiency（see Appendix C）, ப௏
பே
 is positive 
for all workers. The impact of population change through the mass of varieties is  
 
߲ܸ
߲ܰ
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
ൌ ቄͳ െ ൫ͳ ൅ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൯݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻቅ
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
 
. 
1 2 3 4
Populatin L
1
2
3
4
Mass of Firms N
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which is positive, since the relationship between the population and the mass of varieties is 
positive. Utility of every worker increases as the population grows. Differentiating this 
equation with respect to labor efficiency yields 
 
݀
݄݀
൬
߲ܸ
߲ܰ
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൰ ൌ Ƚଶݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
 , 
 
which is always positive. The larger labor efficiency is, the larger 
డ௏
డே
ௗே
ௗ௅
 is. Figure 6a 
illustrates an example of the relationship between labor efficiency and 
డ௏
డே
ௗே
ௗ௅
. 
 
4.1.2 Impact through the price of varieties 
    The impact on the indirect utility function through the change in the price of varieties is 
derived by differentiating (20) with respect to ݌ as follows: 
 
μܸ
μ݌
ൌ െ
ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻܰ
݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ 
, 
 
 
which is always negative, hence utility of workers increases when the price of varieties falls. 
From (16) and (27), the change in the price of varieties is 
 
 
݀݌
݀ܮ
ൌ
݀ ቆ݄଴ ൅
Ƚܧ
ܰ ቇ
݀ܮ
ൌ െ
ߙത݄
ܰଶ
൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
െ
͵ߙത݄ߠ
ͳͲܰ
 
, 
 
which is negative because of ߠܮ ൏ ͳ. The impact of population change through the price of 
varieties is 
 
߲ܸ
߲݌
݀݌
݀ܮ
ൌ
ߙଶ ത݄
݌
൜
ͳ
ܰ
൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൅
͵
ͳͲ
ߠൠ ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ , 
 
which is positive, since the relationship between the population and the mass of varieties is 
positive and ߠܮ ൑ ͳ. Utility of workers increases as the population grows. Differentiating 
this equation with respect to labor efficiency yields 
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݀
݄݀
൬
߲ܸ
߲݌
݀݌
݀ܮ
൰ ൌ
ߙଶ ത݄
݌
൜
ͳ
ܰ
൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൅
͵
ͳͲ
ߠൠ
ൈ ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ሺͳ െ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻሻ . 
(29) 
 
In the case of ߙሺ௙
௖
ሻߠ ൐ ସଽ
ଷ଺଼
, for a critical labor efficiency ݄௣෪ א ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ, (29) is positive for 
Ͳ ൑ ݄ ൏ ݄௣෪, zero for ݄ ൌ ݄௣෪ and negative for ݄௣෪ ൏ ݄ ൏ ݄௠௔௫, hence 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 has a maximum 
at ݄ ൌ ݄௣෪. In the case of ߙሺ
௙
௖
ሻߠ ൑ ସଽ
ଷ଺଼
, there exists a critical population ܮ௣෪. When Ͳ ൏ ܮ ൏ ܮ௣෪, 
there exists a critical labor efficiency ݄௣෪ and 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 is maximum at ݄ ൌ ݄௣෪ as same as in the 
case of ߙሺ௙
௖
ሻߠ ൐ ସଽ
ଷ଺଼
. When ܮ௣෪ ൑ ܮ ൏ ͳȀߠ, (29) is always positive and 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 is increasing in 
labor efficiency (see Appendix D). Figure 6b illustrates an example of the relationship 
between labor efficiency and 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 in the case of ߙሺ௙
௖
ሻߠ ൐ ସଽ
ଷ଺଼
. 
 
4.1.3 Impact through land rent earned 
    The impact on the indirect utility function through the change in land rent earned is 
derived by differentiating (20) with respect to ܴ as follows: 
 
߲ܸ
߲ തܴ
ൌ
ߙ
݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ 
, 
 
 
which is always positive, hence utility of workers increases when land rent earned increases. 
Differentiating (28) with respect to ܮ yields the change of land rent earned in terms of 
population as follows: 
 
݀ തܴ
݀ܮ
ൌ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠ ത݄ , 
 
which is always positive. The larger the population is, the larger land rent earned is.  
The impact of population change through the land rent earned is  
 
߲ܸ
߲ തܴ
݀ തܴ
݀ܮ
ൌ
͵ߙߠത݄
ͳͲ݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ , 
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which is always positive and decreasing, because ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ is decreasing for ݄ א
ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ.  
Figure 6c illustrates an example of the relationship between labor efficiency and 
డ௏
డோത
ௗோത
ௗ௅
. 
 
4.1.4 Impact through effective labor supply 
Effective labor supply is the labor efficiency net of commuting costs. Since labor 
efficiency is independent of urban population, the impact through effective labor supply 
captures the impact through the change in commuting costs caused by urban population 
growth. 
    The impact on the indirect utility function through the change in the effective labor 
supply is derived by differentiating (20) with respect to ݏ as follows: 
 
߲ܸ
߲ݏ
ൌ
ߙ
݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ 
, 
 
which is always positive, hence utility of workers increases when effective labor supply 
increases. Differentiating (25) with respect toܮ yields the change of effective labor supply in 
terms of population as follows: 
 
݀ݏ
݀ܮ
ൌ െߠ݄ ൬ͳ െ
݄
͵ത݄
൰
ଶ
 , 
 
which is negative except for the case of ݄ ൌ Ͳ or ݄௠௔௫. Since workers with labor efficiency 
݄ ൌ Ͳ do not supply labor and workers with labor efficiency ݄ ൌ ݄௠௔௫ always live at the 
CBD, they are not affected in change of commuting costs. Effective labor supply by other 
workers decreases, since the commuting distances increase as the population grows. The 
impact of population change through the effective labor supply is 
 
߲ܸ
߲ݏ
݀ݏ
݀ܮ
ൌ െ
ߙߠ݄
݌
൬ͳ െ
݄
͵ത݄
൰
ଶ
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ ,             (30) 
 
which is negative except for the case of ݄ ൌ Ͳ and ݄௠௔௫. The utility of workers except those 
with the labor efficiency ݄ ൌ Ͳ and ݄௠௔௫ decreases as the population grows. For a critical 
labor efficiency ݄௦෪ א ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ, 
డ௏
డ௦
ௗ௦
ௗ௅
 has a minimum at ݄ ൌ ݄௦෪. Figure 6d illustrates an 
example of the relationship between labor efficiency and 
డ௏
డ௦
ௗୱ
ௗ௅
. 
 
4.1.5 Impact through land rent paid 
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    The impact on the indirect utility function through the change in the land rent paid is 
derived by differentiating (20) with respect to ܴ as follows: 
 
߲ܸ
߲ܴ
ൌ െ
ߙ
݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ 
, 
 
which is always negative, hence utility of workers decreases when land rent paid increases. 
Differentiating (24) with respect to ܮ yields the change of land rent paid in terms of 
population as follows: 
 
ܴ݀
݀ܮ
ൌ
ߠ݄ଶ
͵ത݄
൬ͳ െ
ʹ݄
ͻത݄
൰ , 
 
which is positive except for the case of ݄ ൌ Ͳ. Since workers with labor efficiency ݄ ൌ Ͳ 
always live at the urban boundary and do not pay land rent, they are not affected. Land rent 
paid by other workers increases, as the urban population grows. The impact of populati on 
change through the land rent paid is 
 
߲ܸ
߲ܴ
ܴ݀
݀ܮ
ൌ െ
ߙߠ
͵݌ത݄
݄ଶ ൬ͳ െ
ʹ݄
ͻത݄
൰ ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ , 
 
which is negative except for the case of ݄ ൌ Ͳ. The utility of workers except those with the 
labor efficiency ݄ ൌ Ͳ decreases as the population grows. Differentiating this equation with 
respect to the labor efficiency yields 
 
݀
݄݀
൬
߲ܸ
߲ܴ
ܴ݀
݀ܮ
൰ ൌ െ
ߙߠ
͵݌ത݄
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ݄
ൈ ቊʹ െ ቆ
ʹ
͵ത݄
൅ ߙ
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ቇ݄ ൅
ʹߙ݄ଶ
ͻത݄
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ቋ 
(31) 
 
For a critical labor efficiency ݄ோ෪ א ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ, (31) is negative for Ͳ ൑ ݄ ൏ ݄ோ෪, zero for ݄ ൌ
݄ோ෪ and positive for ݄ோ෪ ൏ ݄ ൏ ݄௠௔௫, hence 
డ௏
డோ
ௗோ
ௗ௅
 has a minimum at ݄ ൌ ݄ோ෪ (see Appendix 
E). Figure 6e illustrates an example of the relationship between labor efficiency and 
డ௏
డோ
ௗோ
ௗ௅
. 
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!  
(a) Mass of varieties ܰ                  (b) Price of varieties ݌: ݄௣෪ ൌ ʹǤ͹ʹʹ 
 
!  
(c) Land rent earned ܴ              (d) Effective labor supply ݏ: ݄௦෪ ൌ ͲǤͺͳ͸Ͳ 
 
  
(e) Land rent paid ܴ:  ݄ோ෪ ൌ ʹǤ͵Ͳͺͳ 
 
Figure 6. Separated impacts through five factors (The set of parameters is shown at Fig.3.) 
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4.2 Aggregate impact of population growth 
    Summing up the separated impacts in Subsection 4.1, we can point out two possibilities 
for the loss of utility. First, since workers with the labor efficiency near ݄௦෪ and ݄ோ෪ are 
greatly affected by the loss of utility in terms of effective labor supply and land rent paid, 
their utility may decrease. Second, since workers with higher labor efficiency are greatly 
harmed by the increase of land rent paid in spite of the fact that their gain from the increase 
of land rent earned is smaller than others, their utility may decrease. 
    Counting up the impacts through five factors shown in Subsection 4.1, the total impact 
of population growth on a worker is as follows: 
 
ܸ݀
݀ܮ
ൌ ቄͳ െ ൫ͳ ൅ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൯݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻቅ
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൅
ߙଶ ത݄
݌
ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ ൜
ͳ
ܰ
൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൅
͵ߠ
ͳͲ
ൠ 
(32) ൅
͵ߙߠത݄
ͳͲ݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ
െ
ߙߠ݄
݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ ൬ͳ െ
݄
͵ത݄
൰
ଶ
െ
ߙߠ
͵݌ത݄
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ݄ଶ ൬ͳ െ
ʹ݄
ͻത݄
൰ 
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship of (32). For workers with labor efficiency ݄ ൌ Ͳ, the 
first three terms in the right hand of (32) are positive and the other two terms are zero, hence 
workers with lower labor efficiency always gain. When urban population increases, 
ௗ௏
ௗ௅
 
decreases except for workers with lower labor efficiency and becomes negative for workers 
with the labor efficiency near ݄௦෪ and ݄ோ෪. At the maximum population of the parameter set 
(ܮ ൌ ʹ), workers with highest labor efficiency lose their utility. For workers with highest 
labor efficiency, since the fourth term of (32) is zero, the fifth term, the increase of land rent 
paid, overweighs the total of the other three terms, the effect of the mass and prices of 
varieties and land rent earned. 
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Figure 7. Relationship between labor efficiency ݄ and ௗ௏
ௗ௅
 (Other parameters than ܮ are 
same as those in Fig.3.) 
 
    Finally, we find out one of necessary conditions that workers with highest labor 
efficiency lose their utility by population growth at the maximum population. Rearranging 
(32) yields 
 
ܸ݀
݀ܮ
ൌ ቈͳ െ ቊ൫ͳ ൅ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൯ െ
ߙଶ ത݄
ܰ݌
൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻቋ ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ቉
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
 
(33) 
൅
͵ߙߠത݄
݌
ቊ
ͳ
ͳͲ
൫ͳ ൅ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൯ െ
݄
͵ത݄
൅ ൬
݄
͵ത݄
൰
ଶ
െ
ͳ
͵
൬
݄
͵ത݄
൰
ଷ
ቋ ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ 
 
Substituting labor efficiency ݄ ൌ ݄௠௔௫ and population ܮ ൌ ͳȀߠ into (33), we can obtain 
one of necessary conditions that (33) is negative as follows (see Appendix F): 
 
ߙ ൬
݂
ܿ
൰ߠ ൏
ʹͶͲͳ
ͳ͵ͺͲ
 . (34) 
 
Inequality (34) holds when ߙ, ݂Ȁܿ or ߠ is small. When utility parameter ߙ is smaller, 
varieties are closer substitutes, hence the mass of varieties is relatively less important than 
the quantity of varieties. When the fixed cost ݂ is relatively smaller than marginal cost ܿ, 
the increasing returns to scale in production is smaller. When the parameter of labor 
efficiency loss caused by commuting ߠ is smaller, the commuting cost is smaller and the 
maximum population is larger. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
    In this section, we consider the implication for the bottom line in the previous section 
and roughly relate the prediction of the present model to the Tokyo metropolitan area. First, 
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when urban population grows larger than a certain critical level, utility of middle-income 
class begins to decrease, and subsequently that of high-income class begins to decrease. This 
implies a possibility that, if the reduction of commuting cost or the increase in labor 
efficiency does not exist, only low-income population increases. When the income 
distribution in a metropolitan area stays constant as urban population grows, the increase of 
labor efficiency by educational investment or the reduction of commuting cost by public 
investment to transportation are imperative. 
Second, since the public land ownership model is employed in the model, every worker 
receives income from their land ownership. Actually, landowners and non-landowners coexist 
in a metropolitan area. Landowners obtain greater benefits of the appreciation of land values 
caused by urban population growth than the result in the previous section, while 
non-landowners suffer greater damage. Since most workers who migrate to a metropolitan 
area are non-landowners, this can be one of factors to curb the growth of a metropolitan area.  
Third, Tomioka and Ohtake (2005) have the data closely-related to the result of our 
model. Their questionnaire LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQFOXGHV WZR LWHPV2QH LV µ'R \RX WKLQN that the 
disparity in income levels expanded in the past ILYH\HDUV"¶DQGWKHRWKHULVµ'R\RXWKink that 
the disparity in income will expand in the QH[W ILYH \HDUV"¶They show that middle-income 
class (annual income from 5 million to 10 million Japanese yen) and residents in metropolitan 
areas (prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Aichi, Osaka and Fukuoka) 
recognize these two items as true more than average. Their report is consistent with our result 
that the utility of middle-income class decreases as urban population grows. 
Finally, making use of Tomioka and Ohtake (2005), the result of our model is projected 
upon Tokyo metropolitan area. Although metropolitan areas in the U. S. are defined by the 
government, there is no counterpart in Japan. The definitions are proposed by a few 
researchers. Kawashima e t .al . (1993) defines Func t ional U rban Regions (FUR), and the 
radius of Tokyo FUR at 1990 is around 40-60 kilometers. Kanemoto and Tokuoka (2002) 
defines Urban Employment Area  (UEA), and the radius of Tokyo UEA at 1995 is around 
50-70 kilometers. The difference arises mainly because the definition of FUR employs a 
mono-centric core while that of UEA a multi-centric core. Here, we put the radius of Tokyo 
metropolitan area as 50 kilometers, because our model assumes a monocentric city. The 
average annual income is about 4,715 thousand Japanese yen from National Tax Agency 
(2012), hence the middle-income class defined in Tomioka and Ohtake (2005) approximately 
corresponds to workers with labor efficiency from ത݄  to ʹത݄ . This implies that the 
middle-income workers who lose most in our model reside typically in the region from 17 
kolometers to 34 kilometers from the center of Tokyo metropolitan area (see Appendix G). 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first formal discussion of the impact of population 
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growth on utility level of workers with heterogeneity of labor efficiency in a city. We have 
analyzed the impact on individual utility from urban population growth in a general 
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring heterogeneity of labor efficiency 
between workers. We have decomposed the cause of the change in utility level into five 
factors: the mass and price of product varieties, land rent earned, effective labor supply and 
land rent paid. The decomposition helps us to understand the relative contribution.  After each 
LPSDFWRQZRUNHU¶VXWLOLW\WKURXJKILYHIDFWRUVLVLQYHVWLJDWHGVHSDUDWHO\ total impact on 
utility level is studied. Our findings indicate that, in case where urban population increases 
without the reduction of commuting cost and the increase in labor efficiency, workers with 
middle labor efficiency have the highest possibility to lose utility and workers with higher 
labor efficiency also have the possibility, while workers with lower labor efficiency always 
gain. 
    This paper limits its focus to autarkic monocentric city. Multicentric city may alleviate 
commuting cost and land rent paid, or a system of city may provide optimal number of cities 
and their sizes. These extensions are left for future research. 
    Since workers/households vary in diverse ways, we believe that the study of the impacts 
on workers/household with various heterogeneities in terms of urbanization should be 
encouraged further. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. The symmetry of price equilibrium 
Behrens and Murata (2007) show that the price equilibrium is symmetric and unique. 
Assuming Ͳ ൏ ݌௠௜௡ ؠ ݌ሺ݅ሻ ൑݌ሺ݅ሻ ൑ ݌௠௔௫ ؠ  ݌ሺ݅ሻ, from (15), 
 
න  ൬
݌௠௜௡
݌ሺ݆ሻ
൰ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
൅
݌௠௜௡ െ ݄ܿ଴
݌௠௜௡
න݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
ൌ ߙܧത  
න  ൬
݌௠௔௫
݌ሺ݆ሻ
൰ ݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
൅
݌௠௔௫ െ ݄ܿ଴
݌௠௔௫
න݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
ൌ ߙܧത  
 
must hold. Subtracting these equations, we obtain 
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൜ ൬
݌௠௔௫
݌௠௜௡
൰ ൅
݌௠௔௫ െ ݌௠௜௡
݌௠௔௫݌௠௜௡
݄ܿ଴ൠන݌ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ఆ
ൌ Ͳ . 
 
If ݌௠௜௡ ൏ ݌௠௔௫, the left hand of this equation is positive. Hence, ݌௠௜௡ ൌ ݌௠௔௫, and the prices 
of varieties are equal. 
 
 
Appendix B. Relationship between urban population and the mass of firms  
    We show here that, under the distribution function of (23), the critical population ܮ෨ at 
which the mass of firms is maximum is larger than the maximum population ͳȀߠ. 
    Differentiating (19) with respect to ܮ yields  
 
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
ൌ
ͳ
ʹ݂ܿܦሺܮሻ
ቆ
ത݄
݄଴
ቇ ൜
͵
ͳͲ
ߙ݂ߠܦሺܮሻ െ
ͻ
ͷ
ߙ݂ܿߠܮ ൅ ʹߙ݂ܿ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ሺߙ݂ሻଶߠൠ . (B.1) 
 
Define the terms in braces as ଵܰ as follows: 
 
ଵܰ ؠ
͵
ͳͲ
ߙ݂ߠܦሺܮሻ െ
ͻ
ͷ
ߙ݂ܿߠܮ ൅ ʹߙ݂ܿ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ሺߙ݂ሻଶߠ 
. 
(B.2) 
 
Differentiating ଵܰ with respect to ܮ yields 
 
݀ ଵܰ
݀ܮ
ൌ
͵ߙଶ݂ܿଶߠ
ͷܦሺܮሻ
െ
ͻ
ͷ
ߙ݂ܿߠ , (B.3) 
 
which is negative since ܦሺܮሻ ൒ ߙ݂. From (B.2), ଵܰ ൌ ʹߙ݂ܿ ൐ Ͳ at ܮ ൌ Ͳ and ௅՜ஶ ଵܰ ൌ െλ, 
hence ଵܰ ൌ Ͳ holds for a value of ܮ෨ ൐ Ͳ. Let ଵܰ ൌ Ͳ and solve for ܮ, we obtain ܮ෨ as 
follows: 
 
ܮ෨ ൌ
ሺͳͲܿ െ ߙ݂ߠሻ ൅ ඥͳͲߙ݂ܿߠ ൅ ሺߙ݂ߠሻଶ
ͻܿߠ
 . 
 
In order to compare ܮ෨ and ͳȀߠ, taking the difference of them yields as follows: 
 
ܮ෨ െ
ͳ
ߠ
ൌ
ሺܿ െ ߙ݂ߠሻ ൅ ඥͳͲߙ݂ܿߠ ൅ ሺߙ݂ߠሻଶ
ͻܿߠ
൐ Ͳ . 
 
Inequality holds because of ඥͳͲߙ݂ܿߠ ൅ ሺߙ݂ߠሻଶ ൐ ߙ݂ߠ, hence the critical population is larger 
than the maximum population(ͳ ߠ ൏ ܮ෨Τ ). 
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Appendix C. Relationship between labor efficiency and demand for each variety  
    We make clear the relationship between labor efficiency ݄ and the demand for a variety 
ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ. 
    Differentiating (21) with respect to ݄ as follows: 
 
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ൌ
ͳ
ܰ݌
൜
݀ݏ
݄݀
െ
ܴ݀
݄݀
ൠ 
, (C.1) 
 
Differentiating (24) and (25) with respect to ݄ as follows: 
 
ܴ݀
݄݀
ൌ െ
ʹߠܮ
݄௠௔௫
ଶ ൬݄ െ
ͳ
ʹ
݄௠௔௫൰
ଶ
൅
ͳ
ʹ
ߠܮ , and (C.2) 
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ൌ
ͳ
ܰ݌
൬
݀ݏ
݄݀
െ
ܴ݀
݄݀
൰ . (C.3) 
  
Substituting (C.2) and (C.3) into (C.1), we obtain the differential of the demand for each 
variety ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ with respect to labor efficiency as follows: 
 
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ൌ
ͳ
ܰ݌
ቊെ
ߠܮ
݄௠௔௫
ଶ ሺ݄ െ ݄௠௔௫ሻ
ଶ ൅ ͳቋ , 
 
which is always positive, and its value is 
ଵ
ே௣
ሺͳ െ ߠܮሻ at ݄ ൌ Ͳ, ଵ
ே௣
 at ݄ ൌ ݄௠௔௫. 
ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ is strictly increasing in ݄, hence varieties are normal goods. Since there exists 
a flexion point at ݄ ൌ ݄௠௔௫, ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ is convex for Ͳ ൏ ݄ ൏ ݄௠௔௫. From (21), the 
value of ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ is ఏ௅௛೘ೌೣ
ଵ଴ே௣
 at ݄ ൌ Ͳ, ௛೘ೌೣ
ே௣
ቀͳ െ ଻
ଷ଴
ߠܮቁ at ݄ ൌ ݄௠௔௫. The reason why 
workers with labor efficiency ݄ ൌ Ͳ can afford varieties is that they earn land rent which is 
equally distributed to each worker. Figure C.1 illustrates the relationship between labor 
efficiency and demand for a variety. 
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Figure C.1. Relationship between labor efficiency݄ and demand for a variety ݍ (The set of 
parameters is shown at Fig.3.) 
 
 
Appendix D. Impact through the price of varieties 
Investigating the properties of (29), we obtain the result shown in 4.1.2. 
    We define ݃௣ଵሺ݄ሻ ؠ ͳ െ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ. Since the other part of (29) than ݃௣ଵሺ݄ሻ is 
positive, we check the sign of ݃௣ଵሺ݄ሻ. ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ is strictly increasing in labor efficiency 
as shown in Appendix C, hence ݃௣ଵሺ݄ሻ ൌ Ͳ has a solution at most. The values of ݃௣ଵሺ݄ሻ at 
the end points of the range in labor efficiency are 
 
݃௣ଵሺͲሻ ൌ
ܦሺܮሻ ቀͳ െ ͵ͳͲߠܮቁ ൅ ߙ݂ ቀͳ െ
ͻ
ͳͲߠܮቁ
ሺߙ݂ ൅ ܦሺܮሻሻ ቀͳ െ ͵ͳͲߠܮቁ
 （D.1） 
݃௣ଵሺ݄௠௔௫ሻ ൌ
ܦሺܮሻ ቀͳ െ ͵ͳͲߠܮቁ ൅ ߙ݂ ቀെͷ ൅
ͳͳ
ͳͲߠܮቁ
ሺߙ݂ ൅ ܦሺܮሻሻ ቀͳ െ ͵ͳͲߠܮቁ
 （D.2） 
 
With attention to the fact that the maximum value of population is ͳȀߠ, both the numerator 
and denominator in (D.1) are positive, hence ݃௣ଵሺͲሻ is always positive. Though the sign of 
the denominator in (D.2) is positive, the sign of the numerator is indeterminate, hence the 
sign of ݃௣ଵሺ݄௠௔௫ሻ is also indeterminate. Defining the numerator of （D.2） as ݃௣ଶሺܮሻ and 
rearranging it yields 
 
݃௣ଶሺܮሻ ؠ െͷߙ݂ ൅ ቆ
ͳͳ
ͳͲ
ߙ݂ߠܮ ൅ ܦሺܮሻቇ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ܦሺܮሻߠܮ . 
 
The first term on the right hand is constant, while the second term , 
ଵଵ
ଵ଴
ߙ݂ߠܮ ൅ ܦሺܮሻ, and the 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Labor Efficiency h
1
2
3
4
5
Demand for Variety q
hmaxh
0
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third term, 
ଷ
ଵ଴
ܦሺܮሻߠܮ, are both strictly increasing in labor efficiency, hence ݃௣ଶሺܮሻ ൌ Ͳ has a 
solution at most. The values of ݃௣ଶሺ݄ሻ at the end points of the range in population are 
 
݃௣ଶሺͲሻ ൌ െͶߙ݂ ൏ Ͳ (D.3) 
݃௣ଶሺͳȀߠሻ ൌ
ͳ
ͳͲ
ሺ͹ඥͶߙ݂ܿȀߠ ൅ ሺߙ݂ሻଶ‐͵ͻߙ݂ሻ (D.4) 
 
When ݃௣ଶሺͳȀߠሻ is negative, ݃௣ଶሺܮሻ is always negative for Ͳ ൑ ܮ ൑ ͳȀߠ, hence ݃௣ଵሺ݄௠௔௫ሻ 
is negative. Paying attention to the fact that ݃௣ଵሺͲሻ is positive, there exist a critical labor 
efficiency ݄௣෪ א ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ and 
ௗ
ௗ௛
ቀడ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
ቁ is positive for Ͳ ൑ ݄ ൏ ݄௣෪, zero for ݄ ൌ ݄௣෪ and 
negative for ݄௣෪ ൏ ݄ ൑ ݄௠௔௫. 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 has a maximum at ݄ ൌ ݄௣෪. From (D.4), the condition that 
݃௣ଶሺͳȀߠሻ is negative is 
 
ߙ ൬
݂
ܿ
൰ ߠ ൐
Ͷͻ
͵͸ͺ
 
. 
 
    In the case of ߙ ቀ௙
௖
ቁߠ ൑ ସଽ
ଷ଺଼
, since ݃௣ଶሺͲሻ ൏ Ͳ and ݃௣ଶሺͳȀߠሻ ൒ Ͳ, the sign of ݃௣ଶሺܮሻ 
changes at ܮ௣෪ א ሺͲǡͳȀߠሻ. When the population is smaller than ܮ௣෪, ݃௣ଶሺܮሻ is negative and 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 has a maximum at ݄ ൌ ݄௣෪ as same as in the case of ߙ ቀ
௙
௖
ቁ ߠ ൐ ସଽ
ଷ଺଼
. When the population 
is larger than ܮ௣, since 
ௗ
ௗ௛
ቀడ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
ቁ is always positive, the higher the labor efficiency, the 
larger 
డ௏
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௅
 is. 
 
 
Appendix E. Impact through land rent paid 
Investigating the properties of (31), we obtain the result shown in 4.1.5. 
We define the terms in braces in (31) as ݃ோሺ݄ሻ as follows: 
 
݃ோሺ݄ሻ ؠ ʹ െ ቆ
ʹ
͵ത݄
൅ ߙ
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
ቇ݄ ൅
ʹߙ݄ଶ
ͻത݄
݀ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ
݄݀
  
 
Since both the second and the third terms, ቀ ଶ
ଷ௛ഥ
൅ ߙ ௗ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ
ௗ௛
ቁ ݄ and ଶఈ௛
మ
ଽ௛ഥ
ௗ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ
ௗ௛
, are 
increasing for Ͳ ൑ ݄ ൑ ݄௠௔௫, ݃ோሺ݄ሻ ൌ Ͳ has a solution at most. The signs of ݃ோሺ݄ሻ at the 
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end points of the range in labor efficiency are 
 
݃ோሺͲሻ ൌ ʹ ൐ Ͳ  
݃ோሺ݄௠௔௫ሻ ൌ െ
ߙത݄
ܰ݌
൏ Ͳ 
 
 
From the above and (32), there exists a critical labor efficiency ݄ோ෪ א ሺͲǡ ݄௠௔௫ሻ and 
ௗ
ௗ௛
ቀడ௏
డோ
ௗோ
ௗ௅
ቁ is negative for Ͳ ൑ ݄ ൏ ݄௦෪, zero for ݄ ൌ ݄ோ෪ and positive for ݄ோ෪ ൏ ݄ ൑ ݄௠௔௫. 
డ௏
డோ
ௗோ
ௗ௅
 has a minimum at ݄ ൌ ݄ோ෪. 
 
 
Appendix F. Relationship between urban population and utility level 
We find out one of necessary conditions that workers with highest labor efficiency lose 
their utility by population growth at the maximum population.  
   Substituting ݄ ൌ ݄௠௔௫ into (33) yields 
 
ܸ݀
݀ܮ
൨
௛ୀ௛೘ೌೣ
ൌ ௅ܸଵሺܮሻ
݀ܰ
݀ܮ
൅ ௅ܸଶሺܮሻ
͵ߙߠത݄
ͳͲ݌
݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ൧೓స೓೘ೌೣ  , (F.1) 
where 
 
௅ܸଵሺܮሻ ؠ ͳ െ ቊቀͳ ൅ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൧௛ୀ௛೘ೌೣ
ቁ
െ
ߙଶ ത݄
ܰ݌
൬ͳ െ
͵
ͳͲ
ߠܮ൰ݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൧
௛ୀ௛೘ೌೣ
ቋ ݁ିఈ௤ሺேǡ௣ǡோǡ௦ǡோሻ൧೓స೓೘ೌೣ  
, 
 ௅ܸଶሺܮሻ ؠ ߙݍሺܰǡ ݌ǡ ܴǡ ݏǡ ܴሻ൧௛ୀ௛೘ೌೣ െ
͹
͵
 
. 
 
 
We investigate the signs of ௅ܸଵሺܮሻ and ௅ܸଶሺܮሻ at the maximum population ܮ ൌ ͳȀߠ. 
Substituting ܮ ൌ ͳȀߠ into ௅ܸଵሺܮሻ yields 
 
௅ܸଵ ൬
ͳ
ߠ
൰ ൌ ͳ ൅ ൝
ͳ͸ͳ
ͳͲͲ
ቆ
ߙത݄
ܰ݌
ቇ
ଶ
െ
ʹ͵
ͳͲ
ቆ
ߙത݄
ܰ݌
ቇ െ ͳൡ ݁
ିଶଷଵ଴൬
ఈ௛ഥ
ே௣൰ . 
 
When 
ఈ௛ഥ
ே௣
 is zero, the value of this equation is zero. When 
ఈ௛ഥ
ே௣
 is in the range from zero to 
ଵଵଵ଴
ଵ଺ଵ
, ௅ܸଵሺͳ ߠΤ ሻ is increasing to a maximum ͳ ൅
ହଵ
ଶଷ
݁ି
యళ
ళ ሺൎ ͳǤͲͲͳͳʹሻ. When ఈ௛
ഥ
ே௣
 is in the range 
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larger than 
ଵଵଵ଴
ଵ଺ଵ
, ௅ܸଵሺͳ ߠΤ ሻ is decreasing asumptotically to one. Hence, ௅ܸଵሺͳ ߠΤ ሻ is positive. 
Substituting ܮ ൌ ͳȀߠ into ௅ܸଶሺܮሻ yields 
 
௅ܸଶ ൬
ͳ
ߠ
൰ ൌ
Ͷ͸
͹
ߙ݂
ܦሺͳ ߠΤ ሻ ൅ ߙ݂
െ
͹
͵
 . 
 
Putting the right hand negative and solving the inequality yields as follows: 
 
ߙ ൬
݂
ܿ
൰ ߠ ൏
ʹͶͲͳ
ͳ͵ͺͲ
 (34) 
 
Since ௅ܸଵሺͳ ߠΤ ሻ is non-negative, (34) must hold when (G.1) is negative at ܮ ൌ ͳȀߠ. (34) is 
one of necessary conditions that workers with highest labor efficiency lose their utility by 
population growth at the maximum population. 
 
Appendix G. Correspondence between labor efficiency and residential location  
      Putting the area inside a circle of radius ݎ as ܵሺݎሻ and the radii at which workers 
with labor efficiency ത݄ and ʹത݄ as ݎ௛ഥ and ݎଶ௛ഥ, 
 
ܵሺݎ୫ୟ୶ሻ െ ܵሺݎ௛ഥሻ
ܵሺݎ୫ୟ୶ሻ
ൌ ܩሺത݄ሻ , and 
ܵሺݎ୫ୟ୶ሻ െ ܵሺݎଶ௛ഥሻ
ܵሺݎ୫ୟ୶ሻ
ൌ ܩሺʹത݄ሻ , 
where ݎ୫ୟ୶ is the distance from CBD to the urban boundary.  
 
Substituting ܵሺݎሻ ൌ ߨݎଶ, ܩ൫ത݄൯ ൌ ͷȀͻ and ܩ൫ʹത݄൯ ൌ ͺȀͻ, we obtain 
 
ݎ௛ഥ ൌ ൬
ͳ
͵
൰ ݎ୫ୟ୶ , and 
ݎଶ௛ഥ ൌ ൬
ʹ
͵
൰ ݎ୫ୟ୶ . 
 
Putting ݎ୫ୟ୶ as 50 kilometers, we obtain 
ݎ௛ഥ ൎ ͳ͹ , and 
ݎଶ௛ഥ ൎ ͵Ͷ . 
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